Navy Medical Department Guide to Malaria Prevention and Control

Introduction

Department of the Navy
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery

The threat to health and readiness of sailors and Marines posed by malaria stimulated the creation of the Malaria "Blue Book" in 1984. Prevention and treatment of malaria is more complex due to the emergence of drug resistance, pesticide resistant mosquito vectors, and large populations of infected people in many areas of the world. The World Health Organization estimates that two billion people are at risk for malaria infection. Each year, malaria causes more than 300 million clinical cases and over two million deaths. In 1995, children under the age of five accounted for 800,000 of those deaths. The direct and indirect costs associated with malaria infections are enormous; costs were over 1.8 billion dollars in 1995 in Africa alone.

Malaria strikes during war, during deteriorating social and economic conditions, and after natural disasters; all situations where the military is called to serve. Deployed forces cannot afford loss of personnel or depletion of resources for cure and convalescence. Protecting and improving the health of airmen, soldiers, sailors, and Marines while serving in such operations requires thorough understanding of the prevention and treatment of malaria. This "Malaria Pocket Guide" includes information to help service personnel:

• Understand the transmission and life cycle of malaria parasites.

• Prevent malaria.

• Diagnose and treat malaria.

• Persuade commanders to enforce malaria preventive measures.

Command Responsibility

Malaria control depends on directed discipline by those in command. In their role as advisors, medical personnel must identify threats, and present countermeasures and their benefits so those in command can make effective decisions. In World War II, Lieutenant General Sir William Slim stopped the longest, most humiliating retreat in the history of the British Army. When he assumed command in Burma in April 1942, the health of his troops was dismal. For each wounded man evacuated, 120 were evacuated with an illness. The malaria rate was 84 percent per year of total troop strength, even higher among the forward troops. In his memoirs, he describes his course of action:

"... A simple calculation showed me that at this rate my army would have melted away. Indeed it was doing so before my eyes.

Good doctors are of no use without good discipline. More than half the battle against disease is not fought by doctors, but by regimental officers. It is they who see that the daily dose of mepacrine (anti-malarial chemoprophylactic drug used in W.W.II) is taken...if mepacrine was not taken, I sacked the commander. I only had to sack three; by then the rest had got my meaning.

Slowly, but with increasing rapidity, as all of us, commanders, doctors, regimental officers, staff officers, and NCOs united in the drive against sickness, results began to appear. On the chart that hung on my wall the curves of admissions to hospitals and malaria in forward units sank lower and lower, until in 1945 the sickness rate for the whole 14th Army was one per thousand per day."

The threat to force readiness that challenged General Slim and his army similarly confronts our forces today. In 1993, a large percentage of Marines and soldiers in certain units participating in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia developed malaria. The explanation for the outbreak is complex, involving a number of factors. The complex life cycle of malaria, lack of command support leading to poor execution of personal protective measures, and incomplete medical intelligence of the malaria threat all contributed.

Available medical intelligence concluded that Plasmodium falciparum was the predominant malaria threat in Somalia. Task Force medical planners were influenced by the Army's policy of not performing G-6-PD screening on its personnel. The risk of precipitating a hemolytic reaction from terminal primaquine prophylaxis had to be weighed against the chance that P. vivax and P. ovale were present. Based on those factors, Task Force medical planners did not recommend terminal primaquine prophylaxis.

Unfortunately, P. vivax was endemic in Somalia, and 75 soldiers developed malaria infections after they returned to the United States. After the first 30 soldiers were diagnosed with P. vivax malaria, terminal primaquine prophylaxis was instituted. Despite this precaution, another 45 soldiers developed malaria infections and had to be hospitalized and administered higher dosages of primaquine. Clearly P. vivax malaria is present in Somalia, and drug resistant strains are developing. It should be just as obvious that poor execution of personal protective measures allowed these soldiers to be bitten by infective mosquitoes. Returning Marines also developed P. vivax infections. The reasons were difficult to quantify, but poor compliance with terminal primaquine prophylaxis and resistant strains of P. vivax were responsible.

The story does not end with the P. vivax malaria outbreak in returning soldiers and Marines. During Operation Restore Hope, medical surveillance revealed that half of all malaria and dengue cases were occurring in a single Marine battalion located in the Baardera area. Investigation of these outbreaks found that the Marine commander did not enforce recommended countermeasures. Fortunately, consequences were minimal. The ill Marines recovered, and the unit was not involved in any significant engagements in its weakened condition.

The examples presented show that malaria is a formidable and deceptive foe to military units deployed into endemic areas. Resistant plasmodia strains exist in most areas of the world, and some species lie dormant and attack long after the threat is perceived to be absent. Drugs once commonly used to prevent and treat malaria are no longer effective. Persuading commanders to enforce personal protective measures is difficult. No vaccine is yet available, though a promising falciparum malaria vaccine is being tested.

However, all the necessary tools are present for successful prevention of malaria. Medical personnel must successfully communicate the threat. After convincing their commanders, medical personnel must teach, supervise, and practice personal protective measures. At the same time, they must be able to diagnose and treat personnel stricken with malaria. It cannot be emphasized enough, as General Slim demonstrated, that success against malaria requires a unified effort enforced by commanders.

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Operational Medicine 2001

Health Care in Military Settings

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