Manual of Naval Preventive Medicine
Chapter 1: Food Service Sanitation
X: Foodborne Illnesses
1-73. Investigating Foodborne Illness.
Department of the Navy
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
1. General. In the event of a suspected foodborne outbreak, prompt
action must be taken to: identify cases associated with the outbreak,
determine the agent causing the outbreak; identify implicated food or
beverage items; and determine the factor or combination of factors
which permitted the outbreak to occur. Early identification of the
agent allows specific treatment of patients. Additional cases can be
prevented by halting service or sale of an implicated food item.
Future outbreaks can be prevented by modifying or correcting
procedures for acquiring, processing and handling the implicated
food. Assistance with the investigation may be obtained from the
nearest NAVENPVNTMEDU or from the Occupational Health/Preventive
Medicine Department at a Naval hospital or clinic by telephone or
message request. Procedures to Investigate Foodborne Illness, a
publication of the International Association of Milk, Food and
Environmental Sanitarians, Inc., P.O. Box 702, Ames, Iowa 50010,
provides excellent guidelines for conducting an investigation.
2. Investigation Procedures. An investigation is composed of
several parts, which often must be accomplished promptly and
simultaneously by the person or persons conducting the investigation.
Ideally, procedures, materials, personnel and responsibilities for
initiating and conducting an investigation should have been developed
in advance.
a. Verify the diagnosis. When suspected cases of
foodborne illness are reported, the first steps involve verifying the
diagnosis of a foodborne disease outbreak.
(1) Complete case history questionnaires.
-
(a) A case history questionnaire must be completed for each
ill person. Table 1-8 provides an example of this type of
questionnaire.
(b) A questionnaire should also be completed for any person
who has not been ill, but who may have been exposed to the suspect
food item, meal, or facility. These "controls" can include family
members, roommates, coworkers, shipmates, and any others at risk
of illness who remained well. Comparisons of ill and well persons
(e.g., food-specific attack rates) are used to analyze factors
contributing to the outbreak.
(c) Case history questionnaires collect information about: the
person (name, rate/rank, social security number, residential
address or work/berthing as assignments, duty station, age, race,
sex, and telephone number); their illness, if any (specific
symptoms and specific times at which symptoms developed), and food
history (when, where and what was eaten, as precisely as
possible). The time at which food was eaten and symptoms started
must be recorded precisely, e.g., "0100" or "1245." Responsible
persons should interview and complete a questionnaire for each
person.
Table 1-8. Case History Questionnaire
(2) Obtain clinical specimens. To confirm
a diagnosis for most foodborne diseases, laboratory analyses must
isolate or identify the etiologic agents in specimens from ill
persons. Ideally, specimens should be collected while the patient is
ill or when the initial interview is conducted. Specimens collected
after the patient recovers may still be useful. If the patient has
diarrhea, obtain a stool specimen or rectal swab. If the person is
vomiting, collect vomitus. Blood specimens are used to detect
antibodies, e.g., hepatitis A, or isolate pathogens, e.g.,
listeriosis or typhoid fever. Blood and/or urine specimens may also
be useful in confirming diagnosis of chemical food poisoning. Contact
the laboratory officer at the nearest medical treatment facility or
NAVENPVNTMEDU for guidance on collecting, storing, and shipping
samples for analysis. If the demand for laboratory analyses exceeds
the capability of the MTF laboratory, contact the nearest
NAVENPVNTMEDU. The units maintain a public health laboratory
capability to conduct many analyses of clinical specimens from an
outbreak investigation or can assist in arranging for appropriate
laboratory analyses.
(3) Collect food samples and/or containers. If food items are
leftover from a suspect meal, or if a commercial product is
suspected, collect and preserve samples for laboratory analysis.
Remaining stocks of suspect food should not be used until the
investigation is complete. Use aseptic techniques and containers to
collect samples; seal and label each container. Collect a sample of
each item weighing 1/2 to 1 pound or measuring 1/2 to 1 pint, if less
is available collect all of it. Samples of perishable foods should be
chilled and held below 40 degrees F (4 degrees C), but should not be frozen.
Commercial foods in containers (e.g., jars or cans) should be kept in
those containers. Empty containers of suspect commercial products
should also be collected and preserved. Contact the nearest
NAVENPVNTMEDU for additional guidance on collecting, storing and
shipping samples for analysis. NAVENPVNTMEDU laboratories can analyze
food samples or can assist in arranging for appropriate laboratory
analyses.
b. Develop a case definition. A case definition allows exposed
persons to be classified as either cases or non cases. A case is
usually defined by symptoms, e.g., a person who was at risk and
developed diarrhea (3 or more loose watery stools within a 24-hour
period), and a time frame. Use the data collected during the initial
phase of the investigation to establish the definition. A case
definition may be specific, e.g., diarrhea and fever (temperature
greater than 100.5 degrees F), or more general, e.g., diarrhea, nausea or
vomiting with or without fever. Cases can be categorized further as
confirmed or suspected. A confirmed case meets the case definition
and has laboratory evidence of infection (e.g., diarrhea and
laboratory isolation of a pathogenic bacteria), while a suspected
case meets the case definition but laboratory confirmation is lacking
or incomplete (e.g., diarrhea only).
c. Make epidemiologic associations.
(1) Although the investigation is not complete, a
preliminary assessment of available data helps to confirm that an
outbreak has occurred. The investigator needs to decide if two or
more persons experienced a similar illness and that the cases are
associated by time (e.g., onset within a few hours or days of each
other), place (e.g., eating at the same establishment or event)
and/or person (e.g., eating same foods).
(2) If there is an outbreak, develop a hypothesis about the type
of illness, possible vehicles of transmission and means by which the
vehicle was contaminated. Hypotheses are possible explanations for
the outbreak; more investigation and/or more data may be necessary to
prove or disprove their role in the outbreak. Table 1-12 lists
potential foodborne illnesses, common foods involved in their
transmission, common means of contamination, and incubation periods.
Decisions on additional investigative efforts (case and control
finding, laboratory analyses, etc.) and their priority should be
guided by the resulting information's value in providing or
disproving the current hypotheses.
(3) If available evidence supports a hypothesis on the etiology or
method of contamination, it may be appropriate to take or recommend
precautionary actions at this time.
d. Provide information. Keep everyone with a "need to know"
informed of the progress and findings to the investigation. Who
"needs to know" varies with the outbreak but may include: appropriate
line commanders; the commanding officer, preventive medicine staff
and/or laboratory officer of the supporting MTF; appropriate public
affairs officers (PAO); and local health department representatives.
If the situation requires informing the public, work with a PAO to
provide objective factual information about the outbreak and clear
recommendations on actions that the public should take.
e. Expand the investigation. Often the initial investigation may
have identified a pathogen. The investigator may have a plausible
hypothesis for the vehicle and its method of contamination. The food
service manager may have implemented the recommendations to prevent
further illness. It is often tempting to conclude the investigation
at this point. Such superficial investigations may underestimate the
true number of cases, miss the true method of contamination, and fail
to alter potentially hazardous food handling procedures. At this
point it is important to find and interview additional persons (both
ill and well) at risk. Complete food history questionnaires on both
ill and well and obtain clinical specimens from ill persons. It may
be appropriate to seek assistance, either consultative support or
on-site support, from the nearest NAVENPVNTMEDU.
f. Investigate food handling procedures. The investigation must
inquire into the source and method of preparation of each item of
food or drink served at a suspected meal. Although a standard
inspection may be conducted, an investigation focusing on high risk
foods and their handling may be more productive. A flow chart
documenting the individual steps from delivery, through preparation,
to service of highly suspect items may be helpful. Talk with the food
service officer(s), manager(s), shift supervisors and the watch
captains. Collect menus, recipes, and lists of personnel with their
assignments. Separately interview food service personnel involved in
handling the suspect item(s). Food service personnel should have a
physical examination and specimens should be collected (e.g., stool
sample or rectal swab), if appropriate.
g. Analyze the data. The organization and summary of data
collected from ill and well persons who ate or drank the suspect item
or meal help to classify the illness, identify involved groups, and
identify a possible vehicle for transmission.
(1) Plot an epidemic curve. Prepare a graph of the
distribution of cases (ill persons) by the time of onset of their
symptoms (figure 1-6.) The period of time covered by the outbreak
determines the unit of time used on the graph. For staphylococcal
food poisoning, use a scale of hours; for a possible salmonella
outbreak, use 6 or 12 hour periods; and for hepatitis A, use days. A
common source outbreak graph will show a sharp peak when many cases
developed their symptoms followed by a gradual tapering off of cases.
Figure 1-6 displays data for a common source outbreak of
staphylococcal food poisoning. An outbreak with person-to-person
spread (e.g., shigellosis) will show a slower rise to a less distinct
peak or may have no dominate peak.
(2) Identify the common symptoms and signs. Symptoms are felt by a
person, while signs are noted by an observer. Use data from ill
persons to prepare a chart showing the percentage of cases with
specific symptoms (e.g., nausea or headache) and signs (e.g., fever).
The predominate signs and symptoms, whether enteric, neurologic or
generalized, help limit the list of possible agents that caused the
outbreak.
(3) Calculate incubation periods and determine a median incubation
period.
-
(a) The interval between ingestion of the suspect food and the
appearance of an initial symptom or sign of illness is the
incubation period. Knowledge of the median incubation period
further limits the list of possible causative agents for the
outbreak. The median is used because it is not affected by
exceptionally long or short incubation periods, as is the mean
(average) value.
Figure 1-6. Example of an Epidemic Curve Graph of Cases by Time of Symptom Onset.
-
(b) Calculate the interval for each case, and determine the
range of incubation periods by identifying the shortest and
longest incubation period. Calculate the median )ncubation period.
(Make a list of the individual incubation periods from shortest to
longest. The middle value on the list, or the average of the two
middle values if there is an even number of cases, is the median
incubation period.)
(c) Table 1-9 displays data on symptom onset and incubation
period for a common source outbreak of staphylococcal food
poisoning. Table 1-10 shows the incubation periods grouped by
two-hour intervals. Both the median incubation period (3.5 hours)
and the large number of cases with illness onset between 2 and 4
hours after eating the suspect food are consistent with
staphylococcal food poisoning.
(4) Calculate attack rates.
-
-
(a) Attack rates, the percentage of ill persons, may be food
or meal-specific. For either type of attack rate to be meaningful,
the investigator must have food and/or meal histories on both ill
and well persons who were at risk of eating the suspect food or
meal. Food-specific attack rates help pinpoint a suspect food
within a meal, and can support observations and conclusions on
food handling that contributed to the outbreak. Meal-specific
attack rates are appropriate when an investigation has not
pinpointed a particular meal; the results may help focus further
investigative efforts.
(b) To calculate the rates, divide the number of persons who
become ill after they ate a particular food or meal by the total
number of persons (both cases and controls) who ate that food or
meal, and multiply the results by 100. Do the same for the persons
who did not eat that particular food or meal. A highly suspect
food or meal will have the highest attack rate for those who ate
that food or meal, and the lowest attack rate for those who did
not eat that food or meal. The difference between the two rates
provides an easy method of comparing different meals or different
foods. The statistical significance of the difference in attack
rates may be tested using tests such as Fisher's exact test or the
chi squared test.
(c) When investigating a disease with a long incubation period
(e.g., hepatitis A), attack rates based on food preference rather
than actual consumption may be necessary. A person's food
preferences may be determined by asking if, when given a choice,
they always or usually eat certain foods (e.g., raw oysters),
purchase particular brand items, or dine at a particular
restaurant.
(d) Table 1-11 is an example of a food specific attack rate
analysis. Persons who reported that they ate potato salad have a
high rate of illness. The difference in attack rates is greatest
for potato salad, which implicates this food item as the vehicle
in the outbreak. Not all people who reported eating potato salad
became ill. Some people may not accurately remember what they ate
or did not eat. The inoculum of infectious agent can vary because
of the size of the portion or focal areas of contamination within
a food. Occasionally, one tray or container of an item may be
contaminated, while the food in another tray is not contaminated.
There is also individual variation in susceptibility to infection.
Table 1-9. Example of Incubation Periods, Onset and Meal Times
by Patient for a Staphylococcal Food Poisoning Outbreak
Patient (number)
|
Ate meal (time)
|
Became ill (time)
|
Incubation period hours
|
|
8
|
1300
|
1345
|
0.75
|
|
20
|
1130
|
1300
|
1.50
|
|
2
|
1130
|
1330
|
2.00
|
|
12
|
1130
|
1345
|
2.25
|
|
21
|
1200
|
1415
|
2.25
|
|
13
|
1130
|
1415
|
2.75
|
|
9
|
1130
|
1430
|
3.00
|
|
10
|
1145
|
1445
|
3.00
|
|
7
|
1130
|
1430
|
3.00
|
|
4
|
1130
|
1445
|
3.25
|
|
5
|
1130
|
1500
|
3.50
|
|
14
|
1200
|
1530
|
3.50
|
|
16
|
1130
|
1515
|
3.75
|
|
22
|
1230
|
1615
|
3.75
|
|
23
|
1200
|
1600
|
4.00
|
|
3
|
1130
|
1545
|
4.25
|
|
11
|
1230
|
1715
|
4.75
|
|
15
|
1200
|
1730
|
5.50
|
|
18
|
1300
|
1845
|
5.75
|
|
1
|
1200
|
2000
|
8.00
|
|
6
|
1300
|
2115
|
8.25
|
|
17
|
1130
|
2230
|
11.00
|
|
19
|
1130
|
0030
|
13.00
|
|
Total (23 cases)
|
|
|
102.75
|
|
Incubation Period:
Range: 0.75 hours (shortest) to 1300 hours (longest)
Median: 3.5 hours
Mean: 4.5 hours (102.75 divided by 23)
h. Use investigative data for prevention. Preventing further
illnesses is the primary purpose of a foodborne illness
investigation. During or immediately after completing the
investigation, recommend and/or implement measures to prevent further
illness. Those measures can include removing suspect items from use
or distribution and suspending or modifying hazardous food handling
practices. When your conclusions and recommendations for preventive
measures are based on well-documented data and findings from a
thorough investigation, it is often easier to obtain support for
implementing the preventive measures.
Table 1-10. Example of Incubation Periods Grouped by Two Hour
Intervals for a Staphyloccal Food Poisoning Outbreak
Incubation Period
|
Number of Cases
|
First 2 hours
|
2
|
2nd-3rd hours
|
12
|
4th-5th hours
|
5
|
6th-7th hours
|
0
|
8th-9th hours
|
2
|
10th-11th hours
|
1
|
12th-13th
|
1
|
Table 1-11. Example of Food-specific Attack Rates for an
Outbreak Investigation
Item of Food
|
Total
|
Persons exposed (ate food)No. ill
|
% ill
|
Total
|
Persons not exposed (did not eat food) No. ill
|
% ill
|
Difference in % ill
|
Potato Salad
|
246
|
192
|
78.0
|
58
|
4
|
6.9
|
71.1
|
Tomatoes
|
253
|
127
|
50.2
|
51
|
19
|
37.3
|
12.9
|
Ice Cream
|
201
|
98
|
48.8
|
103
|
48
|
46.6
|
2.2
|
Beans
|
258
|
129
|
50.0
|
46
|
17
|
37.0
|
13.0
|
Ham
|
230
|
108
|
47.0
|
74
|
38
|
51.4
|
-4.4
|
Crab cake
|
235
|
124
|
52.8
|
69
|
22
|
31.9
|
20.9
|
June 1991
Table 1-12. Table of Incubation Times
Name
|
Etiologic Agent
|
Foods usually involved
|
Incubation Time (Onset of Symptoms)
|
Foodborne Intoxication
|
|
|
|
Staphylococcus Food Poisoning
|
Several Enterotoxins of Staphylococcus aureus
|
Pastries, custards, salads dressings, meat, meat products
|
30 minutes to 7 hours, usually 2 to 4 hours
|
Botulism
|
Toxins procuded by Clostridium botulinum types A,
B, and E, rarely F and G
|
Home canned vegetables, fruits, meats, baked potatoes,
potpies, usually low acid or alkaline.
|
12 to 36 hours, sometimes several days
|
Clostridium perfringens Food Poisoning
|
Toxins elaborated by Type A and C strains of
Clostridium perfringens
|
Meats, stews, meat pies, gravies made of beef, turkey, or
chicken
|
6 to 24 hours, usually 10 to 12 hours
|
Vibrio parahaemolyticus Food Poisoning
|
Enterotoxins and hemolysis (responsible for a hemolytic
reaction, the "kenagwa phenomenon") of Vibrio
parahaemolyticus
|
Seafood, any food cross-contaminated with raw seafood,
food rinsed with contaminated sea water.
|
4 to 96 hours, usually 12 to 24 hours
|
Bacillus cereus Food Poisoning
|
Two enterotoxins of Bacillus cereus, one heat
stable causing vomiting and one heat labile causing diarrhea
|
Rice (such as fried rice), vegetables and meat dishes
|
1 to 6 hours where vomiting is the symptom, 6 to 16 hours
where diarrhea is the predominant symptom
|
Foodborne Infections
|
|
|
|
Viral Hepatitis A (Infectious Hepatitis)
|
Hepatitis A virus
|
Contaminated water and food, including milk, sliced
menats, salads, and raw or undercooked mollusks
|
15 to 50 days, average 28 to 30 days
|
Epidemic Viarl Gastroenteropathy (Norwalk type disease)
|
Norwalk virus, adenoviruses, astroviruses, coronavirus,
and others
|
Clams, oysters, cockles green salads, pastry, and
frostings
|
24 to 48 hours, range 10 to 51 hours
|
Salmonellosis
|
Numerous serotypes of Salmonella, e.g. S. Enteritidia,
S. typhimurium
|
Raw (especially cracked) eggs, egg products, raw milk and
products, meat and meat products, poultry, pet turtles and
chicks
|
6 to 72 hours, usually 12 to 36 hours
|
Typhoid Fever
|
Salmonella typhi
|
Food or water contaminated by feces or urine of a patient
or carrier. Shell-fish from sewage contaminated water.
Flies can infect foods.
|
Usually 1 to 3 weeks
|
i. Submit a Disease Alert Report. Any foodborne disease outbreak
must be reported following the guidelines of the current instruction
on Disease Alert Reports. A reportable foodborne disease outbreak is
any incident in which two or more persons experience a similar
illness after ingestion of a common food or beverage, and
epidemiologic analysis implicates the food or beverage as the source
of the illness. There are two exceptions: one case of botulism or one
case of chemical food poisoning constitutes an outbreak.
Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.
The listing of any non-Federal product in this CD is not an
endorsement of the product itself, but simply an acknowledgement of the source.
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