Emergency War Surgery NATO Handbook: Part III: General Considerations of Wound
Management: Chapter XIV: War Surgery Within the Division
Position and Actions of the Surgeon During Engagements
United States Department of Defense
The battalion surgeon must be apprised of the battle plan and the changing tactical
situation. Only with this knowledge can the surgeon plan the best possible medical support
and have the medics in the right place at the right time. The battle plan, evacuation
capabilities, proximity, and readiness of a surgical care facility will determine where
the surgeon is best utilized.
When battle lines are fluid and air evacuation difficult or impossible, surgeons may be
best placed at aid stations where they can receive, triage, resuscitate and evacuate
casualties emerging from the battle zone. This implies a far forward location of the aid
station and the constant ability to move with the troops to avoid encirclement and
capture.
If air evacuation capability exists, the surgeon may choose to follow the battle with
the battalion commander in the tactical operations center. When large numbers of
casualties are generated, the surgeon may be dispatched by aircraft to the batde scene to
provide on-site triage. Casualties requiring urgent lifesaving surgical intervention may
be triaged directly to a surgical care facility. Other casualties are moved to the aid
station and may be accompanied by the surgeon. As an alternative, the surgeon may elect to
send the senior medic or physician assistant to the scene to provide the triage and direct
casualties to the aid station or to the surgical facility.
If distances to surgical care are great and air evacuation is not possible, the surgeon
may request a surgical team to augment aid station personnel and to perform resuscitative
surgical procedures.
Much of the guidance referable to the tactical deployment of the battalion aid station
is also applicable to the medical company. The medical company must be readily accessible,
as it represents the major site of triage in the evacuation chain. It is also the first
level at which there is a limited holding capability for casualties. Being responsible for
clearing casualties from the brigade area requires proximity to and the ability to move
with the maneuvering elements. The fact that in some units the medical company is organic
to the support battalion rather than an element of a division medical battalion may place
certain constraints upon carrying out the medical mission. These can be resolved only when
the medical officer in command actively participates in planning and decision making.
Overall, none of these factors will adversely affect the triage functions but they may
limit both the sophistication of the medical care and the holding capability of the
unaugmented medical company.
Not surprisingly, medical officers at the division level will find that their most
difficult challenges result from the requirement to move the treatment facilities in
accordance with the flow of the battle. In the attack, it is essential that the medical
company be in proximity to the battalion aid stations. The medical company must move as
far forward as the tactical situation allows. In deep penetrations, elements of one
medical company or, ideally, two or more medical companies can be sequentially deployed or
echeloned so as to provide continuous medical support. During withdrawals, medical
companies or their elements deploy to the rear of each successive delay position, where
they set up to receive casualties. Withdrawing medical elements "leapfrog" past
them to more rearward positions where they in turn set up. Clearly, coordination with
higher command levels, especially for the purpose of allocating additional medical assets,
is essential. The unit and division level medical officer should be aware that the history
of war contains many examples in which nontransportable casualties have by necessity been
left to be taken prisoner. The decision to leave casualties behind is a command, not a
medical, decision, and one that requires a decision as to how many and what types of
medical personnel must remain with the casualties.
It is likely that forward surgical facilities will be co-located with selected medical
companies in support of heavily engaged brigades. Surgical teams are also likely to be
attached to the medical companies of airborne or air-assault divisions. In either
situation, the medical company triage officer will be responsible for determining which
casualties will be treated locally rather than being evacuated to the corps level for
surgical care.
There are two broad indications for local surgical intervention: casualties in
immediate danger of dying and casualties who will be significantly affected by a prolonged
delay in evacuation occasioned by an unfavorable tactical situation. Casualties at risk of
dying are those with abdominal or chest wounds who are in shock, those who are not
responsive to resuscitation, those with closed head injuries showing rapid neurological
deterioration, and those casualties with extremity wounds requiring a tourniquet for
control of bleeding. Casualties with the second indication include those with open
comminuted fractures of the femur and extensive soft tissue wounds in which anaerobic
sepsis is likely to develop.
It is essential that the medical company triage officer be very selective in triage.
Past experience indicates that, as a rule, no more than 5-10% of the total casualty
population requires immediate surgery. At the other extreme of the injury spectrum are
those casualties with minor wounds and the potential for rapid return to duty. This group
is typified by a casualty with one or more superficial fragment wounds or a perforating
gunshot wound of the extremity with small wounds of entrance and exit and no evidence of
bone or neurovascular injury. Individual judgment must be exercised, but overevacuation of
such casualties must not occur.
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Operational Medicine 2001
Health Care in Military Settings
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
Department of the Navy
2300 E Street NW
Washington, D.C
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Operational Medicine
Health Care in Military Settings
CAPT Michael John Hughey, MC, USNR
NAVMED P-5139
January 1, 2001 |
United States Special Operations Command
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MacDill AFB, Florida
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